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Summary. We present a onept to ahieve non-repudiation for nat-
ural language onversations over the Internet. The method rests on
hained eletroni signatures applied to piees of paket-based, digital,
voie ommuniation. It establishes the integrity and authentiity of the
bidiretional data stream and its temporal sequene and thus the seu-
rity ontext of a onversation. The onept is lose to the protools for
Voie over the Internet (VoIP), provides a high level of inherent seurity,
and extends naturally to multilateral non-repudiation, e.g., for onfer-
enes. Signatures over onversations an beome true delarations of
will in analogy to eletronially signed, digital douments. This enables
binding verbal ontrats, in priniple between unaquainted speakers,
and in partiular without witnesses. A referene implementation of a
seure VoIP arhive is exhibited.
1 Introdution
The latest suessful example for the ever ongoing onvergene of information
tehnologies is Internet based telephony, transporting voie over the Internet
protool (VoIP). Analysts estimate a rate of growth in a range of 20% to 45% an-
nually, expeting that VoIP will arry more than fty perent of business voie
tra (UK) in a few years [1℄. The suess of VoIP will not be limited to able
networks, onvergent speeh and data transmission will aet next generation
mobile networks as well. The new tehnology raises some seurity issues. For
eavesdropping traditional, swithed analogue or digital phone alls, an attaker
needs physial aess to the transport medium. Digital networks are generally
more amenable to attaks, as holds already for ISDN and to a yet greater extent
for IP networks. Eorts to add seurity features to VoIP produts are gener-
ally insuient, though proposals exist for the protetion of ondentiality and
privay. Seure VoIP protools, using ryptographi protetion of a all, would
even be at an advantage ompared to traditional telephony systems. Protools
like SRTP [2℄ an provide end-to-end seurity to phone alls, independently of
the seurity of transport medium and ommuniation provider.
With VoIP maturing, it beomes natural to ask for appliation-level seurity
in the ontext of IP telephony. Our purpose is to ahieve non-repudiation in this
ontext, i.e., for speeh over paket-oriented, digital hannels, and in partiular
for VoIP onversations. This means the apability to produe tenable evidene
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that a onversation with the alleged ontents has taken plae between two or
more parties. Anillary information, e.g., that the onversation partners have
designated, personal identities, and the time at whih the onversation has
taken plae, may be of utmost importane in this regard, either to establish
a supporting plausibility, e.g., `aller was not absent during the alleged all',
or to express relevant semanti information, e.g., `telephoni order ame in
before stok prie rose'. For eletroni douments this kind of non-repudiation
is ommonly ahieved by applying eletroni signatures based on asymmetri
ryptography. In the ommuniation between several parties, the desired result
is a binding ontrat, and in analogy the entral goal of the present ontribution
is a tehnology to establish binding verbal ontrats without witnesses.
This subjet has a long pre-history: As early as 1905, Edison proposed the
reording of voie, whih was patented 1911 [3℄. With the advent of digital
signature tehnology, Merkle [4℄ envisioned, referring to Die and Hellman that
Digital signatures promise to revolutionize business by phone. However, work
on non-repudiation of digital voie ommuniation is sare. The work most
losely related to ours is the proposal in [5℄, resting on the theory of ontrats
and multi-lateral seurity [6℄. It omprises a trusted third party (`Tele-Witness')
that is invoked by ommuniating parties to seurely reord onversations and
make them available as evidene at any later point in time.
Non-repudiation of inter-personal ommuniation is interesting beause of
its inherent evidentiary value, exposed by forensi evaluation of the ontained
biometri data, e.g., as an independent means of speaker identiation [7, 8℄.
Methods for the latter are advaned [9℄, yielding to reorded voie a high pro-
bative fore, e.g., in a ourt of law. In omparison to other media, spei
features of voie ontribute to non-repudiation. Voie ommuniation is inter-
ative [10℄ and enables partners to make further enquiries in ase of insuient
understanding. This mitigates to some extent problems to whih signed digital
douments are prone, e.g., misinterpretations due to misrepresentation, lak of
uniqueness of presentation, and inadvertent or maliious hiding of ontent [11℄.
We set out requirements for non-repudiation whih are very partiular in the
ase of VoIP and other multi-media ommuniation over IP, in Setion 2 and
propose the method to meet them in Setion 3. Setion 4 analyses the seurity
of the method by listing and assessing the auditable information seured by it.
Setion 5 desribes the implementation of a seure VoIP arhive. Conlusions
and an outlook are found in Setion 6. A denition of and riterion for mul-
tilateral non-repudiation, used in Setion 3.4, are provided in the Appendix.
2 Requirements for non-repudiation of onversations
From the shemati haraterisation of non-repudiation in the standards [12,
13℄, we fous on the seure reation of evidene for later forensi inspetion.
This overlaps with the basi information seurity targets integrity and avail-
ability of the well-known CIA triad. To aount for the partiularities of the
hannel, we here take a ommuniation-theoretial approah to derive require-
ments for non-repudiation. The general harateristis of the lass of eletroni
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ommuniation that we address are the same for a wide media range, omprising
audio, video, and multi-media. In essene it is always a full duplex or multiplex
hannel operating in real time using data pakets, and we subsume ommuni-
ation over those under the term onversation. Generi requirements for the
non-repudiation of onversations an be proled for spei media, and we
sometimes exemplary allude to the ase of speeh and VoIP. They are grouped
around the top level protetion targets ongruene and ohesion. We desribe
the latter and devise for eah a minimal set of spei, but appliation- and
tehnology-neutral requirements. The requirements are neessary preonditions
to ahieve the protetion targets, and are ordered by asending omplexity.
T1 Congruene. Communiation theory and linguistis have established
that the attributions of meanings an vary between a sender and a reeiver of
a message [14, Chapter 6℄, [15℄  a basi problem for non-repudiation. Apart
from the ambiguity of language, this implies partiular problems for eletroni
ommuniation hannels and media. For digital douments bearing eletroni
signatures, the presentation problem is addressed by invoking the `What You
See is What You Sign' (WYSIWYS [11℄) priniple. It is often taitly assumed
that presentation environments an be brought into agreement for sender and
reeiver of a signed doument [16℄. We term this fundamental target `ongru-
ene'. It has speial traits in the ase of telephony. Essential for non-repudiation
is the reeiver's understanding, whih leads in analogy to the priniple `What Is
Heard Is What Is Signed'. But additionally it is indispensable to assure senders
(speakers) about what preisely was reeived (heard).
R1.1 Integrity of the data in transmission, inluding tehnial environ-
ments for sending and reeiving them. For VoIP, this is to be addressed at the
level of single RTP pakets and their payloads and of an entire onversation.
R1.2 Treatment of losses in the hannel must enable information of
senders about atually reeived information. This is independent of methods for
avoidane or ompensation of losses, suh as Paket Loss Conealment (PLC).
Rather it means a seure detetion of losses (enabled by fullled R1.1), enabling
a proper handling on the appliation level as well as a later (forensi) inspetion.
R1.3 User interation poliies and their enforement nally use fullled
R1.1 and 1.2 to ensure ongruene in the inter-personal onversation. For ele-
troni douments this an simply amount to presriptions about the tehnial
environments in whih a eletronially signed doument must be displayed. Or
it an be an involved sheme to guarantee the agreement of ontents of dou-
ments undergoing omplex transformations [17, 18℄, e.g., between data formats.
For speeh, it an be realised in various ways taking into aount the interative
nature of the medium. This is elaborated on in Setion 3.5.
T2 Cohesion regards the temporal dimension of onversations. It means in
partiular the protetion and preservation of the sequene the information ows
in all diretions of the hannel. Again this is at variane with signed douments,
where temporal sequene of ommuniation is immaterial. Cohesion means to
establish a omplete temporal ontext of a onversation usually even in absolute
time, sine the temporal referene frame of a onversation an be meaningful.
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R2.1 Start times of onversations must be determined and reorded. This
is analogous to the signing time of douments (the assignment of whih is a
requirement for qualied signatures aording to the EU Signature Diretive).
R2.2 Temporal sequening of onversations must be proteted and re-
lated to the referene time frame established by fullling R2.1.
R2.3 Continual authentiation of ommuniation devies and if possible
even ommuniation partners is neessary, e.g., to prevent hijaking.
R2.4 Determined break points must allow for non-repudiation of on-
versations until they are terminated intentionally or inadvertently.
From the requirements analysis it is apparent that ongruene and ohesion
are omplementary but not orthogonal ategories. A spei prole for VoIP is
not formulated here for brevity, but rather inluded in the development of the
method below. It is understood that additionally the known standard require-
ments for eletroni signatures as delarations of will and for non-repudiation
of eletronially signed douments, whih are rooted in the theory of multi-
lateral seurity [19℄, must be taken into aount. We do not address details of
user authentiation, onsent to reording, general privay, ondentiality, and
interation with respet to the signing as a delaration of will proper. Nonethe-
less, the method proposed below enables the seure reording and arhiving to
preserve the probative value of a onversation, as demonstrated in Setion 5.
3 The method
The requirements (R2.4) entail that signing a entire onversation with a single
RSA signature by A is not viable, sine this yields full disposal to determine
(maliiously) the end time of signing of a onversation, and deprives B of any
possibility to ontrol and verify this during onversation. The opposite approah
to seure single pakets does not assure ohesion (R2.2 in onjuntion with
R1.1), sine single RTP-pakets ontain only little audio data whih may then
easily be reordered. Apart from that, it would be omputationally expensive.
This is the prime motivation for the method we now present in general for the
ase of a bilateral onversation between A and B, using, e.g., the SIP/RTP
protool ombination [20, 21℄. In a basi model A seures the onversation
as an unilateral delaration of will. We proeed in a bottom-up fashion from
the base onept of intervals of VoIP data, over seuring their integrity by a
ryptographi hain, to oping with inevitable paket loss. For later referene we
all the tehnique presented in 3.1 3.4 below the interval-haining method.
3.1 Building intervals
Intervals are the logial units on whih the protetion method operates. In-
tervals span ertain amounts, whih may be nil, of RTP pakets for only one
diretion. As bi-diretional ommuniation needs formation of intervals for both
diretions, A and B hold buers for pakets both sent and reeived. Sine di-
retions are handled dierently w.r.t. paket loss, as desribed in Setion 3.3,
diretionally homogeneous intervals are advantageous from a protool design
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viewpoint. To resolve the full duplex audio stream into an interval sequene
we determine that intervals in the diretions from and to A alternate. Intervals
are enumerated as I2k−1, I2k, k = 1, . . . , N for diretions A → B and B → A,
respetively. Interval Il omprises RTP pakets (pl,j), j = 1, . . . ,Kl, sent or
reeived by A. For the moment we assume that there is no paket loss.
The length of an interval (in appropriate units) is a main adjustable param-
eter, and an important degree of freedom. Adjustable sizes of, e.g., data frames
are not very ommon in ommuniation tehnology, but reent proposals [23℄
show that they an be advantageous in ertain situations, like the present one.
We determine that interval boundaries are triggered by the elapse of a ertain
time, alled interval duration and denoted by D. If T is the duration of the on-
versation then N = ⌈T/D⌉. Basing intervals on time neessitates the formation
of intervals without voie data payload when a silene period exeeds D. This
design hoie entails some signalling, transport, and ryptographi overhead.
This is however outweighed by some favourable properties. In partiular, the
maximum buer length is known from the outset, and ontrol of the interval
duration is a diret means to ope with the (known) slowness of (publi key)
ryptographi soft- and hardware. Adjustment of D therefore allows for an,
even dynamial, trade-o between seurity and performane, as it ontrols the
ratio of seurity data to payload data. The alternative of triggering intervals by
full-run of paket buers at both sides auses onurreny problems.
Sine the ommuniation hannel is fully duplex, the sequene of intervals
does not reet the temporal sequene of audio data, rather I2k−1 and I2k
omprise approximately onurrent data sent in both diretions. But this is
immaterial sine intervals are only logial units and seurity data for intervals
an be stored separately from the RTP streams. This is a key feature of our
method. It does not aet the VoIP ommuniation at all but an be run in
omplete  logial and even physial (extra hardware)  separation from it.
VoIP ommuniation is therefore not impeded by our method.
3.2 Cryptographi haining
The basi idea is to ryptographially seure the payload ontained in eah
interval and inlude the generated seurity data in the subsequent interval to
form a ryptographi hain. We use the shorthand (·)X
def
=PrivX(h(·)) for entity
X' digital signature by applying a private key PrivX and a hash algorithm h(·).
TS is a time-stamping authority. The notation −→ signies the sending of some
data. To sign a onversation A performs the following operations.
SeI : MI
def
= (D, SIP_Data,Auth_Data, none, . . .) −→ B;
S0
def
=
(
(MI)A
)
TS
−→ B;
Sel : Sl
def
= (Il, Sl−1)A −→ B; l = 1, . . . , 2N
SeF : MF
def
= (termination_ondition, . . .) −→ B;
SF
def
=
(
(MF , S2N)A
)
TS
−→ B;
In the initial step SeI , (·)TS means a time-stamp applied by TS, e.g., aording
to RFC 3161 [22℄, and is enveloping the meta-dataMI signed by A (R2.1). This
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may inlude some authentiation data Auth_Data , e.g., A's digital ertiates.
To provide a broad audit trail for later inspetion, data from the all nego-
tiation and onnetion establishment, here subsumed under SIP_Data, should
be inluded. The nal time-stamp an be used optionally to detet drift, and
narrows down the onversation in time. Sine this is suient to seure the
temporal ontext required for ohesion, the appliation of time-stamps in every
step, whih may be ostly, is not proposed. A none is inluded in MI to pre-
vent replay attaks. By inluding Sl−1 in the signed data Sl and S2N−1 in SF ,
and alternation of interval diretions, R1.1 and R2.2 are satised. Signatures
of A and additional authentiation data in MI support R2.3. If ommuniation
breaks inadvertently, interval haining is veriable up to the last interval, thus
R2.4 is satised, with a loss of at most one interval duration of onversation
at its end. A ontrols interval timing and the operations SeI , Sel, and SeF
our at times 0, ⌊l/2⌋ ·D, and N ·D, respetively.
3.3 Treatment of paket loss
Digital voie ommuniation oers a rather high reliability leading generally to
a higher understandability of VoIP ommuniation in omparison with all pre-
deessors. However, paket loss may our and must be treated as explained in
R1.2. Denote by δl ⊂ {1, . . . ,Kl} the sequene of identiers of pakets atually
reeived by A respetively B. Intervals are redued aordingly to I ′l
def
=(pl,j)j∈δl .
The steps Sel are modied by a protool to report reeived pakages.
Se
′
2k−1 : repeat
repeat
interval_termination −→ B;
until δ2k−1 −→ A;
until S2k−1
def
= (I ′2k−1, S2k−2)A −→ B;
Se
′
2k : repeat
S2k
def
= (I ′2k, S2k−1)A −→ B;
δ2k −→ B;
until suess;
This aounts for losses in the VoIP (RTP) hannel as well as failures in the
hannel for transmission of signing data. The loop onditions an be evaluated
by expliit (Se
′
2k) or impliit (Se
′
2k−1) aknowledgements by reeivers.
3.4 Extension to multilateral onversations
Here we present the simplest way to extend the method above to onferene-
like situations. Multilateral non-repudiation means mutual agreement about the
ontents of a onversation between all parties as dened in the Appendix. For
implementing it for M partiipants A0, . . . , AM−1 a round-robin sheme [24℄
an be used to produe the required hain of signatures as in Lemma 1. Round-
robin is a simple algorithm to distribute the required seurity data between the
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partiipants of the onferene. Other base algorithms of distributed systems
like ooding, eho, or broadast might be used, depending, for instane, on the
partiular topology of the onferene network. During the round, a token is
passed from partiipant to partiipant, signalling the signer role. If partiipant
Am arries the token, he waits for time D and buers pakets sent by himself.
When Am terminates the interval a signalling and signing protool is proessed,
whih, in ontrast to the sheme above, only onerns data sent by Am. The
numbering of intervals is as follows. In the time span from 0 to D the pakets
(pm;j) sent by Am are in the interval Im. The pakets emitted by Am during
[D, 2D] are in IM+m, and so on. It is here not feasible to sign merely the pakets
reeived by everyone, beause umulative paket loss ould be too high. Instead,
an additional hashing indiretion is inluded and hashes Hθk
def
=(h(pk;j))j∈θ of all
pakets θ reeived by at least one person from Am in interval k are distributed
and an be used to hek the signature in spite of paket loss. Let δσk denote the
list of pakets sent by Am and reeived by Aσ in interval k. Set Rm
def
= {0, ..,M−
1}\m and let r ≥ 0 be the round number. In order to aount for latenies in
reporting of paket loss, omputing hashes, and signing, we introdue a parallel
oset in the round-robin sheme. In round r partiipant Am arrying the token
terminates interval with number k̂(r,m)
def
= rM2+(M +1)m+1. He seures the
set of intervals Î(r,m)
def
=
(
k̂(r,m)−M · {0, . . . ,M − 1}
)
∩ N.
Se_multr,m : ∀σ ∈ Rm do
repeat
interval_termination −→ Aσ;
until (δσk )k∈bI(r,m) −→ Am;
od;
θk
def
= ∪σ∈Rmδ
σ
k for k ∈ Î(r,m);
Dr,m
def
=
(
(δσk )σ∈Rm , H
θk
k
)
k∈bI(r,m)
;
Sr,m
def
= (Dr,m, Spred(r,m))Am ;
∀σ′ ∈ Rm do
repeat
(Sr,m, Dr,m) −→ Aσ′ ;
until suess;
od;
The preeding seurity value Spred(r,m) bears indies
pred(r,m) =


(r,m− 1) if m ≥ 1;
(r − 1,M − 1) if r ≥ 1, m = 0;
I otherwise,
where I stands for the initialisation interval whih an be onstruted as in
the preeding setions, replaing single sending by broadast with aknowl-
edgements. The numbering sheme for Intervals and the evolving sequene of
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D 2D 3D 4D 5D 6D 7D 8D 9D
A0 1 5 9 13 17 21 25 29 33
A1 2 6 10 14 18 22 26 30 34
A2 3 7 11 15 19 23 27 31 35
A3 4 8 12 16 20 24 28 32 36
Fig. 1. Numbering of intervals in the ase of 4 partiipants along the time axis. Arrows
indiate the sequene of seurity values S. Thiker borders separate rounds. Equally
oloured intervals are seured in a single operation Se_mult
r,m
.
seurity values is shown in Figure 1 below. In eet, Am broadasts (with a-
knowledgement) a signature over hashes of all pakets reeived by at least one
other partiipant. This is the ommon seurity data with whih the hain an
be ontinued. Aording to Lemma 1, non-repudiation of the total, multilateral
onversation for the rst interval duration from time 0 to D is ahieved after
exeution of Se_mult2,M−1 at time 2M · D. With eah further exeution of
Se_mult a subsequent piee of onversation of length D obtains multilateral
non-repudiation.
In ase of all termination, 2M+1 nalisation steps without audio data (two
nal rounds plus nishing by the partiipant arrying the token at the time of
termination) are required to obtain non-repudiation of the last interval in time.
Joining and leaving a signed multilateral all while the signature is reated by
the partiipants an be enabled through nalisation. If partiipant B requests
to join the all, Am, who posses the token, initiates a nalisation and B an
join after this (inserted as m + 1). In the ase that a partiipant likes to leave
he awaits the token and nalises inluding a leave message.
3.5 Operational poliies
We do not lay out a omplete set of rules for the operation of a system using
the non-repudiation method above. Rather we list the most obvious ones and
stress the most important point of monitoring and treatment of paket loss, or
rather understandability.
To aount for requirement R1.3, users should be signalled at any time
during a onversation about the signature status of it. This neessitates to an
extent speied by appliation-spei poliies the ryptographi veriation
of the interval haining, and ontinual evaluation of relevant information, see
Setion 4.1. Additionally a seure voie signing terminal should ontrol every
aspet of user interation and data transmission. This is eluidated in [25℄.
To maintain ongruene and mitigate attaks aiming at mutilating a onver-
sation, paket loss and the ensuing level of understandability must permanently
be monitored. When the paket loss is above a ongurable threshold, an ation
should be triggered aording to determined poliies. The priniple possibilities
are: 1. ignore; 2. notify users while ontinuing signing; 3. abort the signing; and
4. terminate all. The rst two options open the path for attaks. Termination
of the all is the option for maximum seurity. From a pratial viewpoint, the
loss threshold is seldom reahed without breakdown of the onnetion anyway
due to insuient understandability or timeouts.
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Options 3 and 4 provide a `Sollbruhstelle' (predetermined break point) for
the probative value of the onversation. In ontrast, most other shemes for
seuring the integrity of streamed data, e.g., the signing method of [26℄ aim at
loss-tolerane, for instane allowing for the veriation of the stream signature
with some probability in the presene of paket loss. We suggest that for the
probative value of onversations, the former is advantageous. A signed all with
an intermediate gap an give rise to speulations over alternatives to ll it, whih
are restrited by syntax and grammar, but an lead to dierent semantis. Using
this, a lever and manipulative attaker ould delete parts of the ommuniation
to laim with ertain redibility that the remnants have another meaning than
intended by the ommuniation partner(s). If the ontents of a onversation
after suh an intentional deletion are unveriable and thus annot be used to
prove anything, this kind of attak is eetively impeded.
4 Seurity onsiderations
We orroborate the statement that interval haining an ahieve non-repudiation
for VoIP onversations, based on the information generally seured by interval
haining. An analysis based on an instane of a system arhiteture (the VoIP
arhive presented in Setion 5 below) and possible attaks is ontained in [27℄.
4.1 Auditable information
In this setion we analyse the information that an be gained and proved to
have integrity in a all seured by interval haining. Table 1 gives a, perhaps
inomplete, overview over this audit data, whih may be amenable to foren-
si inspetion, e.g., by an expert witness in ourt, or, on the other extreme,
appliable during the ongoing onversation, or both.
4.2 Comparison with SRTP and IPse
The well-known seurity methods SRTP and IPse address the protetion of
ondentiality, authentiity and data integrity on the appliation, respetively
network layer, and an be applied to VoIP and as well in parallel with interval-
haining. We want to show salient features of interval-haining, whih distin-
guishes it from both standards and in our view provides a higher level of non-
repudiation and even pratiality. On the fundamental level, both SRTP and
IPse neessarily operate on the paket level and do not by themselves pro-
vide protetion of the temporal sequene and ohesion of a VoIP onversation.
While it is true that pertinent information an be reonstruted from the RTP
sequene numbers, in turn proteted by hash values, suh an approah would
have some weaknesses, whih taken together do not allow full non-repudiation.
In partiular, RTP sequene numbers an suer from roll-overs and though their
integrity is seured in transmission, they an still be rather easily be forged by
the sender, sine they belong to protool staks whih are not espeially se-
ured in ommon systems. While paket loss an be deteted or reonstruted
using sequene numbers, interval haining yields a well-dened, tunable, and
ryptographially seured means to deal with it during an ongoing onversation,
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Auditable item Req. Protetion
target
Veries/indiates When ap-
pliable
Initial time stamp 2.1 Cohesion Start time Always
Initial signature & ertiate 2.3 Cohesion Identity of signer Always
Interval Chaining 2.2, 1.1 Cohesion Interval integr. & order Always
Paket loss in intervals 1.2, 2.4 Congruene QoS, understandability Always
Monotoni inrease of RTP-
sequene numbers
1.1, 2.2 Integrity &
ohesion
RTP-stream plausibility Always
Relative drift of RTP-time
marks against system time
2.2 Cohesion RTP-stream plausibility During
onvers.
Relative drift of RTP-time
marks against ⌊l/2⌋ ·D
2.2 Cohesion Paket & stream plausi-
bility
Ex post
No overlaps of RTP-time
marks at interval boundaries
2.2 Cohesion Paket & stream plausi-
bility
Always
Replay-window Integrity Uniqueness of reorded
audio stream
Always
Final time stamp 2.2 Cohesion Conversation duration Ex post
Forensi analysis of reorded
onversation
(Semanti)
authentiity
Speaker identity, mood,
lying, stress, et.
Ex post,
forensi
Table 1. Auditable information of a onversation seured with interval haining.
Columns: Seured data item audited, Non-repudiation requirement addressed, Pro-
tetion target supported, Atual information indiated or veried, and when is the
hek appliable.
signiantly limiting potential attak vetors. In essene, RTP sequene num-
bers are not designed to ensure a onversation's integrity and thus have lower
evidentiary value in omparison to hained intervals. From the viewpoint of
eletroni signatures, their level of message, respetively, onversation authen-
tiation an only be ahieved with an protool-independent means to manage
authentiation data suh as asymmetri keys, i.e., a Publi Key Infrastruture.
The onnetion and session dependent key handling of IPse and SRTP, relying
on HMACs and merely allowing for symmetri keys deprived of authentiation
semantis, are generally insuient for non-repudiation. Interval haining is an
independent means to ontrol the ryptographi workload beneting salability.
Finally, NAT traversal is a problem for network layer integrity protetion like
IPse sine rewriting IP headers invalidates orresponding hash values (a solu-
tion has been proposed by TISPAN [28℄). This problem does not our with the
interval haining method, sine only RTP headers, not IP headers of pakets
need to be (and are in the implementation below) signed.
5 Appliation to a seure VoIP arhive
In this setion we present an eient self-signed arhive for VoIP alls and its
system arhiteture. It was implemented as a prototype together with a veri-
ation and playbak tool, requires no modiation to the terminal equipment,
and seures the ongoing onversations `on the y'. Setion 5.1 was partially
published in [27℄. It uses timestamps to seure the exat starting-time of a on-
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versation and not the moment of arhiving. The main design priniple is that
of minimal tehnial requirements on the ommuniation lients. Figure 2(a)
shows the ommuniation between two partners A and B over a VoIP hannel.
The seurity omponent VSe, the omponent implementing the interval hain-
ing, an listen to the ommuniation at any point in the hannel. Neither the
exat position in the hannel nor the tehnial method by whih VSe interepts
it is essential for the arhiteture and its seurity properties. It an be loated
at the site of either of the parties A or B , e.g., in the ase of all-entre ap-
pliations. The hannel is not required to be digital, let alone SIP/RTP based,
end-to-end, provided that there is some part of the hannel whih is VoIP. This
ondition is already met in many mobile and publi swithed networks. Aord-
ingly, the phones used by A and B need not be ISDN or VoIP phones. VSe will
often be under the ontrol of one of the parties or even be integrated in their
VoIP infrastruture.
A B
VSec
Arc
VoIP channel
T2
T1
(a) (b)
Fig. 2. (a) High-level modular arhiteture of a seure voie arhive. (b) The veri-
ation and playbak tool performing heks on the arhived all.
The role of VSe an be passive or dual, for instane to enfore poliies,
f. Setion 3.5. The separation of suh a omponent is standard in seurity
engineering where it is ommonly known as a referene monitor [29℄. The om-
ponent Ar denotes the arhive to whih the seured VoIP ommuniation is
submitted and then persistently stored, with due onsideration of long-term se-
urity. T1 and T2 are time-stamping authorities whih ome into play to raise
resiliene against attaks, e.g., if VSe, Ar or both are ompromised.
5.1 Implementation
The arhive system has been implemented as a prototype and tested with sev-
eral soft phones and devies, e.g., AVM's Fritz!Box [30℄ using SIP/RTP. For
B we used mobile phones, ISDN phones, and also SIP software lients. VSe
was implemented using C#, running on an embedded x86 based PC without
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keyboard, mouse or video ports on Linux OS with the Mono-framework. It was
plaed as an outbound proxy, substituting A's original one, between A and the
Internet using its two NICs, thus supporting multiple onurrent lients and
alls. The proxy modies RTP ports and IP addresses ontained in the SIP
pakets redireting them to itself and forwards them to the original reipients.
A traditional PC was used for Ar, onneted over a reliable TCP hannel (TLS
an be used for privay) using the third NIC of VSe.
Intervals are formed as in Setion 3.2 and 3.3, though paket loss is here
handled by simply storing a list of the reeived pakets. This is an obvious
neessity as the terminal equipment annot be modied in a pure arhiving se-
nario. VSe arries an X.509 ertiate together with the private (RSA) key to
sign intervals, inluding S0 and SF ontaining meta data. The signing operation
(·)A is extended beyond the presented formal sheme by not using, e.g., RSA
signatures diretly, but instead PKCS#7 signed envelope (where data is to be
stored together with its signature) and PKCS#7 detahed signatures (where
signatures are stored alone). This has the advantage to store and transport
ertiates and ertiate hains in ombination with the data. For storage ef-
ieny, only the rst interval's PKCS#7 signed envelope ontainer ontains
the whole ertiate hain up to, but not inluding the root, while all other
ontainers do not need to arry this redundant information. S0 is also wrapped
in a signature from the time stamp servie T1.
The ertiate and private key of VSe are not only used to sign the on-
versation, but also to authentiate VSe toward Ar. Eah ompleted interval
is immediately transmitted to Ar, whih then performs several tests, see Ta-
ble 1, inluding signature veriation. It then stores it as hunks into an open
le. This yields resiliene even against severe attaks, e.g., a ompromised VSe.
Ar heks the trusted third party time stamp from T1 immediately at the start
of the all, thus the live arhiving annot be delayed, and also heks eah in-
terval as soon as it arrives. Therefore, a ompromised VSe would have to forge
onversations in duration of an interval, i.e., in real time, whih is infeasible.
On the other hand, a ompromised Ar does not posses the ertiate. Even if
both ollude, they were still be bound inside the two timestamps from T1 and
T2, whih ould be ompared, e.g., to an itemised bill from the phone ompany.
The implemented system performed very well and was able to arhive mul-
tiple parallel alls on the mentioned hardware without notable load or memory
pressure. The duration of an interval is one of the main onguration parame-
ters to be tuned. One seond proved to be suient to provide a high level of
seurity for the ontext of the talk on the one hand, and on the other hand to
keep the omputational power required by far low enough for the used proes-
sor, and also the storage overhead (400 bytes for PKCS#7 signatures without
embedded ertiates) to payload ratio small.
6 Conlusions
IP-based multimedia ommuniation is not restrited to VoIP, for instane by
now, several video onferening systems are maturing, some of whih are based
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on sophistiated peer-to-peer ommuniation [31, 32℄. Moreover the servie qual-
ity and availability of the new ommuniation hannels is onstantly inreasing
through developments like paket loss onealment (PLC) for audio [33℄ and
even video [34, 35℄ streams. Our proposed method for non-repudiation is appli-
able in all these ontexts. Its adoption would pave the way for a new paradigm
for trustworthy, inter-personal ommuniation.
The next steps in our researh are to i) implement the operational on-
text for eletroni signatures over speeh, i.e., user interation and signalling,
ii) devise a trustworthy signature terminal for that purpose, preferably using
Trusted Computing tehnology on mobile devies, e.g., to seure audio I/O and
proessing, iii) extend the method to onferenes and other media than VoIP.
Appendix: Multilateral non-repudiation with signatures
Contrats embodied in paper or eletroni form often bear the attribute of
mutual non-repudiation (in the ase of two parties) if both A and B reeive a
opy of the doubly signed doument, and know with ertainty that the other
party has it as well. To ahieve mutuality in digital ontexts, some kind of
bi-lateral eletroni signing must be performed. For eletroni douments, it is
well known that a simple, three-step protool (alled BAKO [36℄), enveloping
three signatures in the sequene ABA around the doument, sues.
This setion superially formalises the notion of a multilateral agreement
between parties A1, . . . , AM on the fat Comm whih is the logial assertion
that a ertain ommuniation has taken plae between them. A more rigorous
treatment in terms of formal languages an be found in [37℄. Assume that Comm
an be aknowledged with ertainty by Aℓ, i.e., Aℓ asserts his knowledge that
no sequene of events an our whih negates Comm, by digitally signing it,
i.e., by forming (Comm)Aℓ . We write
(Comm)Aℓ =⇒ KnowsAℓ(Comm).
Multilateral non-repudiation is partial ommon knowledge of Comm in the sense
that every party knows that every party knows Comm, i.e.,∧
ℓ=1,....,M
KnowsAℓ
(∧
k=1,....,M
KnowsAk(Comm)
)
.
In extension of BAKO for mutuality we nd
Lemma 1. Multilateral non-repudiation of Comm is ahieved for A1, . . . , AM
by formation of
(. . . (((. . . ((Comm)A1)A2 . . .)AM )A1)A2 . . .)AM .
Proof. Replaing B in the BAKO sheme ABA by A2 . . . AM we see that for-
mation of ((. . . ((Comm)A1)A2 . . .)AM )A1 establishes
KnowsA1
(∧
k=1,....,M
KnowsAk(Comm)
)
.
The statement follows by iteration.
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